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The	Frugal	Four	exhibit	a	British	attitude	to	European
integration
The	proposal	put	forward	by	the	European	Commission	to	issue	common	debt	to	finance	the	economic	recovery
from	the	coronavirus	pandemic	is	a	remarkable	and	unprecedented	step	in	EU	solidarity.	Despite	Germany	and
France	backing	it,	a	small	but	significant	group	of	member	states	remain	vehemently	opposed	to	parts	of	the	plan.
Their	position	looks	similar	to	previous	British	complaints	about	the	EU,	highlighting	that	this	debate	is	not	just	about
money.	It	is	driven	by	fundamentally	different	views	on	further	European	integration,	argues	Pepijn	Bergsen
(Chatham	House).
Following	a	joint	proposal	from	Germany	and	France	for	a	€500bn	recovery	fund	for	the	regions	and	sectors
hardest	hit	by	the	pandemic,	and	financed	by	the	Commission	borrowing	in	the	markets,	the	Commission	put
forward	its	own	proposal	in	late	May.	Under	this	plan	it	would	borrow	€750bn,	of	which	€500bn	would	be	used	for
grants	and	€250	would	be	lent	to	member	states	under	beneficial	conditions.
Regardless	of	the	final	composition	of	the	spending	plans,	member	states	agreeing	on	a	recovery	fund	would	break
the	taboo	on	common	borrowing	in	the	EU.	Although	forms	of	collective	borrowing	have	happened	before,
something	of	this	scale	would	be	a	first.	Shared	fiscal	capacity	is	generally	regarded	as	one	of	the	missing	pieces	in
the	architecture	of	the	eurozone.	Some,	including	the	German	finance	minister,	have	therefore	recently	alluded	to
the	potential	creation	of	the	fund	as	a	Hamiltonian	moment	–	a	reference	to	the	US	treasury	secretary	who	ensured
that	the	federal	government	took	on	the	states’	debt	resulting	from	the	US	War	of	Independence.	Such	a
comparison	overplays	the	significance	of	the	fund,	as	member	states	will	remain	liable	for	their	existing	debts	and
the	additional	debt	arising	from	the	current	crisis.	Most	importantly,	the	fund	is	clearly	designed	to	be	a	one-off.
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This	could	explain	why	Germany,	previously	a	vocal	opponent	of	fiscal	integration	in	the	eurozone,	surprisingly
came	out	in	support	of	it.	Its	previous	allies	in	opposing	fiscal	integration,	mainly	in	the	eurozone,	have	put	up
significant	opposition,	including	during	the	inconclusive	European	Council	meeting	on	June	19th.	The	Netherlands
and	Austria	initially	teamed	up	as	the	‘Frugal	Four’	with	non-euro	Sweden	and	Denmark	to	oppose	a	recovery	that
would	provide	grant	funding.	Although	nominally	supportive	of	European	solidarity	and	of	ensuring	that	the	current
crisis	does	not	cause	more	divergence	in	economic	fortunes	in	the	eurozone,	the	Frugal	Four	put	on	the	table	a
counterproposal	that	would	offer	only	the	slightest	bit	of	help.	Demanding	that	countries	pay	back	the	spending	they
would	receive	from	the	fund	would	limit	the	cost	to	them	of	the	plan	even	further	though.
This	suggests	that	this	is	mainly	a	debate	about	money,	not	completely	dissimilar	to	the	scraps	over	the	next	EU
budget	earlier	this	year.	The	leaders	of	the	Frugal	Four,	who	come	from	both	the	centre-left	and	the	centre-right,	do
not	want	to	be	seen	sending	their	taxpayers’	money	to		‘spendthrift	Southerners.’	Even	if	their	opposition	to	the
subsidies	in	the	plan	has	now	softened,	they	have	made	clear	that	they	at	least	want	to	retain	their	budget	rebates.
The	similarities	with	previous	British	positions	in	the	EU	are	clear.	The	Frugal	Four	prime	ministers	value	their
rebates	as	much	as	Margaret	Thatcher	once	did.	It	is	not	too	much	of	a	stretch	to	say	that	the	current	proposal
would	never	have	even	made	it	to	the	table	had	the	United	Kingdom	still	been	a	member	of	the	EU,	as	London
would	have	almost	certainly	vetoed	it.	One	of	the	arguments	often	put	forward	in	favour	of	Brexit	was	that	the	UK
should	leave	before	it	would	inevitably	get	roped	into	the	eurozone’s	mess.	During	the	euro	crisis,	the	UK	largely
avoided	this	fate,	only	contributing	to	the	bailouts	of	Portugal	and	Ireland.	But	having	to	pay	for	economic	support
for	the	southern	euro	countries	is	exactly	what	is	now	being	asked	from	non-euro	countries	like	Sweden,	Denmark
and	the	Czechia.
The	comparison	with	the	UK	is	also	instructive	because	the	frugal	four	were	often	closely	aligned	with	London	in
EU’s	debates.	They	broadly	share	the	British	focus	on	free	trade	and	on	the	EU	as	an	economic	project,	as
opposed	to	its	political	dimension,	as	Germany	more	often	tends	to	focus	on.	Just	like	the	UK,	the	Frugal	Four	also
tend	to	have	relatively	Eurosceptic	electorates,	albeit	ones	that	continue	to	indicate	in	polls	that	they	would	vote	to
remain	in	the	EU	if	asked.
The	COVID-19	crisis	has	drawn	attention	to	Italian	voters	and	their	disillusionment	with	the	EU	caused	by	the	lack
of	support	they	experienced	during	their	time	of	need	in	this	pandemic.	As	Catherine	de	Vries,	a	preeminent	scholar
of	public	opinion	on	European	integration	showed	on	this	blog,	this	does	not	mean	they	necessarily	want	to	follow
the	UK	out	of	the	EU.	If	anything,	they	are	instead	asking	for	more	Europe,	in	part	out	of	dissatisfaction	with	the
functioning	of	their	own	democracy.
In	contrast,	electorates	in	many	of	the	so-called	frugal	countries	tend	to	be	relatively	satisfied	with	their	national
governments	and	the	state	of	their	democracies,	while	significantly	less	enthusiastic	about	further	political
integration	in	the	EU.	They	have	not	looked	to	the	EU	as	a	potential	source	of	help	during	the	pandemic,	focusing
instead	almost	exclusively	on	what	their	national	government	could	and	should	do	for	them.
Because	the	fund	proposed	by	the	Commission	is	clearly	a	one-off	solution,	designed	to	soften	the	economic	fall-
out	of	a	once-in-a-century	pandemic,	it	probably	provides	at	best	a	template	for	deeper	permanent	integration	in	the
future.	Nevertheless,	many	EU	citizens,	particularly	in	the	‘frugal’	member	states,	will	see	it	as	the	Rubicon	of	fiscal
integration	being	crossed.	In	reality,	merely	lending	money	to	Southern	member	states,	as	the	Frugal	Four	are
currently	proposing,	would	resemble	previous	bailouts	rather	than	any	sort	of	template	for	a	permanent	fix	for	the
eurozone’s	incomplete	institutional	set-up.
A	recent	poll	in	the	Netherlands,	whose	government	has	been	the	most	vocal	opponent	of	the	plans	for	a	common
fiscal	response	to	the	current	crisis,	shows	that	72	per	cent	of	Dutch	voters	agree	with	the	government’s	position	on
loans	versus	grants.	In	contrast,	a	poll	among	German	voters	highlighted	that	just	over	half	support	the	Franco-
German	plan,	which	was	also	based	on	grants	instead	of	loans.	The	divergence	between	Dutch	and	German
attitudes	is	particularly	striking	because	they	used	to	be	closely	aligned	on	these	issues.	Whereas	the	German
government,	including	Chancellor	Merkel,	has	clearly	seen	the	risk	to	the	survival	of	the	single	market	that	a	halting
recovery	in	Italy	and	Spain	would	pose	and	has,	therefore,	recently	been	actively	working	to	change	public	attitudes
in	her	country,	the	Dutch	government	chose	to	emphasise	its	opposition	to	the	plans	from	day	one.
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Governments	and	politicians	in	the	Frugal	Four	largely	continue	to	talk	about	European	integration	in	the	way	most
British	politicians	used	to,	using	it	as	a	handy	scapegoat	for	unpopular	policy	and	blustering	in	Brussels	mainly	to
satisfy	their	domestic	audience.	In	the	short	run,	this	strategy	has	led	them	to	clash	with,	not	just	most	of	the	rest	of
the	bloc,	but	also	their	previous	ally	within	the	EU	–	Germany.	In	the	long	run,	such	a	strategy	raises	questions	over
how	the	Frugal	Four	will	deal	with	the	secular	pressure	for	more	integration	within	the	eurozone,	particularly	for	the
Netherlands	and	Austria	as	Denmark	and	Sweden	are	unlikely	to	join	the	single	currency	anytime	soon.	Even	in
areas	other	than	the	euro,	there	will	be	a	push	for	more	integration.	This	will	create	conflict	with	the	vision	of	the	EU
that	many	of	these	member	states	share	with	the	UK,	which	is	now	no	longer	in	the	club	helping	them	to	push	back
against	this	direction	of	integration.
A	clear	appreciation	of	their	small	size	and	heft	in	the	world	and	their	deep	economic	integration	with	the	rest	of	the
EU	would	likely	discourage	them	from	following	the	UK	out	of	the	union.	But	the	current	episode	once	again
highlights	the	difficulty	of	deeper	integration	between	countries	with	very	different	visions	for	the	future	of	the	EU
and	a	political	class	unable,	or	unwilling,	to	try	and	shift	their	electorate’s	stance	on	Europe.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	Photo:	Raul	Mee
(EU2017EE),	Some	rights	reserved.
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